

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

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## ALLIES MOVE TO SAFEGUARD INVASION PLANS BY ISOLATING EIRE

EIRE'S reappearance in the news sharply reminds the world that a base for Axis diplomacy, espionage, and relaying of information still exists within 100 miles of Britain's coast—a perilous situation as preparations to invade the Continent approach the final stages. The Allied governments took formal note of this when our State Department appealed on February 21 to the Dublin government for removal of Axis consular and diplomatic representatives in Eire, adding the hope that this step would take the form of a diplomatic rupture. The British government, taking no steps of its own, expressed concurrence in the American action. Assurances were added that the note was not an ultimatum and that no move toward invasion was contemplated.

Premier de Valera's rejection of the proposal was prompt and decisive, his immediate oral refusal being followed by a conclusive note on March 7. It is also reported that full mobilization of the Irish army has been ordered, and a general state of alert proclaimed. These preparations have not been put to the test, but that the Allied attitude also is firm is plain from the British order of March 13 halting all but essential government travel between the two islands. Steps have also been taken to check travel across the partition line between Eire and Northern Ireland. Meantime the United States government has released the text of a note stating that an Irish request in January to charter an American ship was refused. It appears that two ships formerly so chartered were sunk, presumably by enemy action, and that the Irish refused to protest the act, alleging want of evidence.

**WHY NEUTRALITY?** The policy of neutrality is accepted by the Irish people almost without question, and only one member of parliament—Mr. James Dillon—openly demands intervention. This is true notwithstanding the enlistment of over 100,000 Irishmen in the British forces and the employment in

Britain of at least 100,000 more. To most of agricultural Ireland, isolated and poorly informed, world events and even the war seem remote. Moreover, the notion of allying himself with the British is still highly unpalatable to the average man. The Irish tradition of hatred for English rule, and resentment of a long line of grievances has grown weaker with time and change; but the habit of mind still lingers, and the partition issue remains very much alive.

Even if he himself felt otherwise—which he does not—Mr. de Valera would find himself obliged to defer to this body of public opinion; and criticisms based on the moral duty of nations to support the Allied cause, or the gratitude which Ireland should feel for British protection serve only to infuriate the Irish people and their leaders. The government lost 10 seats in the 1943 elections, and while it is still strong enough to govern, it is no longer secure. It is therefore inevitable that Mr. de Valera should seek to increase his popularity in the country, and anything like a foreign challenge to Irish sovereignty presents him with the perfect issue.

The fact remains that this close attention to local interests is certain to make Irish statesmanship look narrow and provincial to the world outside—and wilfully so, since Irish leadership is well aware of developments abroad. It is therefore but just to add that the Irish wartime attitude, both official and unofficial, has been far from hostile to the United Nations. Suspected Axis spies and saboteurs have been under close police surveillance. When U.S. Minister Gray complained that enemy agents in the German ministry and in the countryside had been sending radio messages home, the government was able to reply that the German Minister had been deprived of his radio sender, and that while five paratroopers—not two, as alleged—had indeed landed in Ireland with radio equipment, they had all been rounded up. In addition, it has been pointed out that very few of

the Allied airmen forced down in neutral territory have been interned, most being set free on the ground that they were "not on operational flights." The popular feeling toward Americans is traditionally cordial, and friendship for the English has risen to unprecedented heights, largely because of Britain's steadfast respect, to date, of Ireland's neutral claims.

**WHAT CAN WE DO NOW?** As a result of this good feeling and cooperation within, and perhaps even beyond, the legal limits of neutrality, Irish aid to the British war effort has been perceptible. Against this must be set certain other facts. The lack of naval bases in Ireland was sorely felt during the most critical period of U-boat warfare, for the Irish flatly refused to reopen to British use the three ports turned over to them by the Chamberlain government. The so-called Irish Republican Army, illegal but inadequately repressed, has been a constant threat to Britain's efforts and a temptation to German agents in search of saboteurs. Undoubtedly there has been some leakage of valuable information through I.R.A. members operating in Britain, and the gravity of this situation must increase in proportion to the imminence of invasion.

Mr. Churchill's statement that Eire will be cut off from the world may indicate that economic sanctions are intended. If applied, their effect could be decisive, for the country depends on Britain for coal and the U.S. for oil and wheat. However, the political setback to the U.S. and Britain if stronger economic measures were taken—except in case of proved

necessity—might be serious. It is significant that Mr. de Valera appealed to Prime Minister Mackenzie King for the good offices of Canada, chief spokesman for the smaller nations. Great power will always be suspect to those whom it can endanger, and the coercion of Eire could not but breed uneasiness among the other small peoples of Europe and elsewhere. Nor can the possible effect upon the British Commonwealth be overlooked. In Canada itself, for example, there is unanimous support for the United Nation's cause and much resentment of the Irish attitude of aloofness, while the Prime Minister has in this case associated himself with the British position. Reports indicate, however, an underlying approval of Irish insistence on the right to take an independent position. This strong national feeling cannot be ignored in London without danger to imperial unity. As for Washington, the Administration is certainly aware of the strong pro-Irish element in this country and probably not unaware of the traditional allegiance of this element to the Democratic party.

It therefore seems likely that the U.S. and Britain will move with caution, and improbable that force will be used on Eire where it has been withheld against Turkey, Spain and Argentina. The determining factor will presumably be the danger to Allied military secrecy, for the political consequences even of strong moves would hardly be comparable to a military disaster in Western Europe.

SHERMAN S. HAYDEN

## PUCHEU TRIAL REFLECTS VIEWS OF FRENCH UNDERGROUND

With the pronouncement of the death sentence on Pierre Pucheu by a special military court in Algiers on March 11, the first trial of a high Vichy collaborator reached its conclusion. The trial, which is expected to be only the first in a series that will continue in France after the country's liberation, has met with divided reaction among Frenchmen in North Africa. Recent arrivals from France regard the trial and its verdict with complete approval, while those who have been abroad for some time contend it was a mistake and should have been postponed until after the enemy was forced out of France. Only then, they argue, can all the evidence be assembled and a court appointed by a regularly elected government be constituted.

### WILL ALL VICHYITES BE FOUND GUILTY?

The formal indictment against Pucheu consisted of four charges: (1) alleged acts against the security of the state; (2) treason; (3) illegal arrests; and (4) malfeasance in office in connection with the three preceding charges. The court found the defendant, who had served first as Minister of Industrial Production and later as Minister of the Interior in the Vichy government from February

1941 until April 1942, innocent of the charges of "acts against the security of the state" and "illegal arrests." Pucheu was found guilty, however, of "treason," specifically of collusion with the Nazis. The fact that he was not convicted of subverting the internal security of the French state merely because he had belonged to the Vichy cabinet means, in effect, that Pétain's totalitarian régime that supplanted the republic based on the ideals of the French Revolution was not indicted in so far as purely domestic affairs are concerned. Moreover, the court was not willing to declare that every one who had supported Pétain—at least during the period from June 1940 until November 1942, when the United States and Russia had official representatives at Vichy and there was still a semblance of an independent French policy—must be ruled out of the new France. This distinction between the earlier and later phases of Pétain's régime may prove important because most observers agree that thousands of Frenchmen whose patriotism was without question followed the "hero of Verdun" during the first period of his rule.

**THE TRIAL VIEWED POLITICALLY.** Like most trials connected with offenses against the state,

Pucheu's case was of major political importance. The trial was clearly intended by the French Committee of National Liberation, under whose auspices it was held, as an effort to assure the Committee's popularity in France at the time of the nation's liberation. Members of the French underground who have recently come to North Africa insist that the Algiers authorities would not be accepted by the resistance movement unless they first demonstrated unalterable opposition to all who cooperated with the enemy. Among the newcomers the Communists, particularly, have been intransigent on this point. The Committee, on its part, has long held the theory that civil war may best be prevented in post-war France if the leading collaborators are destroyed by properly constituted legal authorities. Only in this way, the Committee contends, can widespread and indiscriminate killing of persons who may or may not have participated in handing over the state to the Germans be prevented. Whether this theory will work when put to the test remains to be seen, but the French Committee is not alone in advancing it, for the European Allies and the United States have similarly promised to try war criminals in the occupied and enemy countries.

**THE TRIAL VIEWED LEGALLY.** Legally, the trial of Pucheu left much to be desired by many Frenchmen in Algiers. Those who are critical had wanted the trial to be an example of legal perfection, partly because they desired to create a striking contrast to the farcical 1942 Riom trials of the Third Republic's leaders, and partly because they hoped to show the glaring differences between arbitrary Nazi methods and French justice. Although the court of five judges was constituted with a careful view to French practices and the defendant was allowed to summon witnesses and make a public defense, the ideal of a perfect trial could not be attained under current circumstances. Much of the testimony was necessarily delivered in secret for reasons of military security and much evidence that would have been

pertinent was not available in Algiers. Above all, the suspicion and hatred in the courtroom was hardly conducive to the cool atmosphere associated with justice during more normal times.

Legal difficulties arose particularly in connection with the charge that Pucheu had personally handed over French hostages to the Nazis to be shot. Although there was no evidence at hand to support this charge and General Giraud declared that he had seen a document while he was still in France that indicated Pucheu's refusal to carry out the German demand for hostages, the prosecution dwelt at length on the allegation. By doing so the impression was created that mere hearsay would be considered as acceptable evidence. It should be noted, however, that some of the testimony that seemed extraneous to Anglo-American observers was not so regarded by French jurists. Under the Roman law used in French courts, the rules of evidence are much looser than in common law and permit the introduction of facts having only an indirect bearing on the case.

**REPERCUSSIONS ABROAD.** The French National Committee has taken the view that the trial of Pucheu was strictly an affair among Frenchmen and of no concern to the Allies, which is understandable in view of the struggle it has been making to constitute itself as the recognized French authority. But any question bearing on the possibility of civil war in France is of concern in London, Washington and Moscow, as well as in Algiers, and may influence the negotiations that are now going on for full recognition of the French Committee as its nation's provisional government.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

#### BLAIR BOLLES HEADS WASHINGTON BUREAU

Blair Bolles, member of the editorial staff of the *Washington Star* since 1935, has been appointed director of the Washington Bureau of the Foreign Policy Association. The appointment was effective March 15.

Mr. Bolles has specialized in writing on foreign affairs at *The Star*. He has contributed articles on foreign and domestic politics to *Harper's*, *The Nation*, *American Mercury*, *American Magazine*, *Liberty*, *Saturday Review of Literature*, *Free World*, and others. He reported on Europe at war last year when, as a member of a group invited by the Swedish government, he visited Sweden, and also England, Portugal and Bermuda. Mr. Bolles is a regular contributor to the North American Newspaper Alliance and, with Duncan Aikman, was co-author in 1939 of *America's Chance of Peace*.

Mr. Bolles was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 26, 1911, and was educated at Phillips Exeter and at Yale. He was a reporter for the *Washington Herald*, Universal Service and the *New York American* before he joined the *Washington Star*.

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#### ON THE THRESHOLD OF WORLD ORDER

by Vera Micheles Dean

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
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# Washington News Letter



MARCH 13.—Ever since Louis D. Brandeis became chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs during World War I, U.S. citizens have taken an active interest in the development of Palestine as a "Jewish National Home," to which Jews could migrate from all parts of the world. The pressure of the Brandeis committee and of English Zionists led to the Balfour declaration of November 2, 1917, which declared that establishment of the national home was one of Britain's war aims.

**SEEK WHITE PAPER ABROGATION.** American interest is currently reflected in identical resolutions recently introduced into the Senate and the House, urging that "the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country." The objective of the resolution—sponsored by Senators Robert Wagner of New York and Robert Taft of Ohio, and by Representatives James Wright of Pennsylvania and Ranulf Compton of Connecticut—is abrogation of the White Paper on Palestine issued by the British government on May 17, 1939. This White Paper, setting forth the principle that Jews should number not more than one-third of Palestine's population, ordered that Jewish immigration into the territory cease on March 31, 1944. As of September 30, 1942, the population of Palestine was officially estimated to include about 1,000,000 Arabs and nearly 500,000 Jews—a ratio of two to one.

On May 23, 1939 Winston Churchill, then out of office, told the House of Commons that the one-third principle meant "destruction of the Balfour Declaration." In 1930 the Council of the League of Nations, which had mandated Palestine to Britain, adopted the principle that Jewish immigration into the mandate was to be limited only by the territory's "economic absorptive capacity." The Treaty of Sevres of 1920, which settled the peace between the Allies and Turkey (from which Palestine was carved), and the preamble to the mandate specifically recognized the Balfour Declaration. But the 1939 White Paper apparently doomed the Jews—suffering from their minority position in European countries and persecuted actively in Germany by the Nazi regime—to be a minority group in Palestine.

Arab agitation brought about the transition from the humanitarian promise in the Balfour Declaration to the compromise in the White Paper. As early

as 1920, in the Muslim Nebi Musa celebrations, Arabs displayed their animosity toward Zionist Jews. During the middle 1930's German and Italian agents fed the Arab apprehension that they might become a minority in Palestine, and the British government, after laying aside a proposal for partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, issued its White Paper out of concern for the safeguarding of British interests in the predominantly Arab Middle East. Arabs presented their point of view directly to the American Congress on February 25, 1944 by a message from Jamil al Madfai, president of the Iraq Chamber of Senators, addressed to Vice President Wallace and to Speaker Rayburn of the House: "I am convinced," he wrote, "that any increase of Jewish immigration into Palestine would eventually result in bloodshed and certainly in disturbed conditions which would not contribute to the happiness of the Jews settled in that country or to that of the Arabs."

The considerations which caused the British government of Neville Chamberlain to issue the White Paper in 1939 press today upon the United States, which has direct strategic interests in the Middle East. Ten days ago General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, called those interests to the attention of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an executive session, and urged the Committee to defer action on the Wagner-Taft Resolution. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had previously held four public hearings on the Wright-Compton Resolution and may report it to the House.

**PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT OFFERS HOPE.** Prime Minister Winston Churchill has not renounced the White Paper policy which he criticized before he became Prime Minister. On November 10, 1943 Oliver Stanley, British Colonial Secretary, said that the policy stands with one modification: that immigration of roughly 31,000 would be permitted beyond March 31, 1944 to complete the quota of 75,000. President Roosevelt on March 9 told Rabbi Stephen S. Wise of New York and Dr. Abba J. Silver of Cleveland that the United States had never given its approval to the White Paper, and authorized them to say: "The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees; and that when future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home."

BLAIR BOLLES

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